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 ABSTRACT    
 
During the global financial turmoil in 2007-2008, deviation from the covered interest parity 
(CIP) between the Korean won and US dollar through the foreign exchange swap has escalated 
in its magnitude beyond 1,000bp in November 2008, and it still persists around 100bp level. In 
this paper, we examine a newly developed margin based asset pricing model using Kalman 
filter approach and show that the escalation of the CIP deviation is found to be significantly 
related to the global dollar funding illiquidity and country-specific funding conditions. 
Furthermore, we find evidence that the poor funding conditions (or higher margins) are driven 
by the general money market illiquidity and may lead to higher funding illiquidity, which 
suggests the reinforcing effects of the liquidity spiral. We also show that the supply of dollar 
liquidity and improved funding conditions help alleviate the deviations from the parity, 
however the persistent anomaly is found to be related to the high level of volatility in the FX 
swap market. 
 
 
 
 
한국 원화와 미 달러화 간 무위험 이자율 평형관계(covered interest parity)의 괴리는 
2007~08년 글로벌 금융위기 시 큰 폭으로 증가하여 1,000bp(2008년 11월)를 상회한 바 
있고, 최근에도 100bp를 기록하는 등 여전히 높은 수준을 유지하고 있다. 본고는 금융위기 
시 무위험 이자율 평형관계가 큰 폭으로 붕괴된 현상을 설명하기 위해 Garleanu and 
Pedersen(2011)의 마진을 기초로 한 자산가격결정모형(margin-based asset pricing 
model)을 상정하고 칼만 필터(Kalman filtering) 기법을 활용하여 실증분석을 시도하였다. 
분석 결과, 무위험 이자율 평형관계의 괴리는 글로벌 달러 유동성 및 원화를 이용한 
자금조달여건과 유의한 관계를 지니는 것으로 나타났다. 특히 유동성과 자금조달여건 간에 
음의 상관관계가 존재하여 달러 유동성 위기 시 무위험 이자율 평형관계의 괴리가 추가적으 
로 증폭되는 유동성 악순환(liquidity spiral) 현상이 나타났음을 발견하였다. 또한 본고는 
달러 유동성 공급 및 자금조달여건의 개선에도 불구하고, 여전히 차익거래 유인이 높은 것은 
환율 변동성이 높은 수준에서 유지되고 있는 것과 관련이 있음을 보였다. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
During the global financial crisis in 2007-2008, the covered interest parity (CIP) is 
violated in many currency pairs, including South Korean won and US dollar. Not 
only the deviation from the parity was huge in its magnitude but it still persists up to 
the recent time. The covered interest parity, in essence, states that if free flow of 
capital is allowed, the duplicated dollar return using KRW/USD spot and forward 
should be equal to the dollar return. Basically, any sizable deviations from the parity 
implies that there exists a profitable arbitrage between the dollar spot and duplicated 
dollar derivatives (or FX swap), and as far as the arbitrage trade is allowed without 
constraints, the deviation from parity will automatically revert to zero profit level in 
a short period of time. 
The question on what caused the deviation from the CIP has long been tackled by 
many authors. Largely, two types of explanations have been offered for the parity 
dislocations –  limited arbitrage and risk compensation. Transaction costs (e.g. 
Frenkel and Levich (1977)), capital controls of government (e.g. Ito (1986)), and 
institutional weakness (e.g. Alper et al. (2007)) have been the major subjects of the 
literature on the arbitrage restrictions, while other studies on political risk (e.g. Aliber 
(1973)), liquidity risk (e.g. Bhar et. al (2004)), counter party risk (e.g. Baba et. al (2008), 
Baba and Packer (2009)), and funding liquidity risk (e.g. Coffey et. al (2009)) focus on 
the risky components imposed in the CIP deviations. In light of the recent 
development during the global financial crisis, funding liquidity risk (e.g. Coffey et. 
al (2009)) have been considered as the main cause of the deviation, considering the 
fact that the deviations are observed in many currency pairs involving the US dollar 
in the situation where dollar funding liquidity is scarce. Regarding the dislocations 
of the CIP relation between KRW and USD, similar types of explanations have been 
emerged. For example, structural imbalance between supply and demand in the 
forward market (e.g. Yang and Lee (2008) and Whang (2010)) and credit and 
liquidity risks (e.g. Ryu and Park (2008) and Yoo (2010)) are suggested as the main 
causes of the deviations. However, the question on how the deviation from the CIP 
has emerged in the recent global financial crisis has not been much investigated in 
the literature. 
In this paper, we would like to shed some lights on the channel through which 
the global dollar funding crisis affect the CIP deviations in the KRW and USD pair 
based on a newly developed asset pricing model by Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) 
using our econometric methodology. They argue that the equivalent securities in 
normal times are no longer equivalent in bad times, especially when the funding 
liquidity is dried out. In a liquidity crisis, funding positions in risky assets are costly, 
and therefore, securities with higher margins1 (or harder funding conditions) will be 
                                                           
1 In our paper, the margin is the difference between the collateral value and the face value of a 
security. Therefore, higher margin can be understood as tighter funding condition because one can fund 
smaller portion of the face value. Please refer to the Section II. 1. about the formal definition of the margin. 
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discounted compared to lower margin securities. Especially, the funding liquidity 
premium will emerge and be determined by the security-specific funding conditions 
and general cost of funding, or equivalently referred to as the shadow cost of capital 
in their paper. The US dollar funding shortage driven by the liquidity crisis made the 
financial institutions become more cautious about funding the long positions in 
Korean won, and therefore, the CIP deviations emerged. Additionally, Korean 
financial institutions have experienced currency crisis because of the vast outflow of 
foreign capital, which results in the heightened counterparty risk. This will 
eventually deteriorate the Korea-specific funding condition and contribute further 
deviations of the CIP. 
 Their theoretical foundations are quite intriguing and have important 
implications on the liquidity crisis – the bad time when funding constraints are 
binding. Here, we discuss a bit about their theory to understand more on the CIP 
deviations. Basically, the funding constraint in their model is stating that the 
maximum capital use from funding their positions in risky assets cannot exceed his 
or her total wealth. If the constraint is binding, then additional need for a unit capital 
should reflect the funding liquidity premium, or the shadow cost of capital. They 
show that binding funding constraint leads to several interesting stylized facts. First, 
riskless interest rates for collateralized loans jump down during the financial crisis. 
This happens because the risk tolerant agents cannot borrow as they would like to 
and the risk averse agent should lend less than they wanted to. This can be induced 
by decreasing the riskless interest rates dramatically. Second, the spread between 
uncollateralized and collateralized loans increases. This occurs when the risk tolerant 
agents have binding margin constraints, and at the same time the risk averse agents 
do not participate in the uncollateralized loan market. Since the risk tolerant banks 
cannot borrow from the risk averse agent, the interbank uncollateralized loans 
should reflect the shadow cost of capital and require additional premium compared 
to the Treasury rates. Third, the Law of One Price can be violated and last long. This 
can be explained if two assets have different margin requirements while having the 
same cash flows. Under the binding margin constraints, the risk tolerant agent will 
require additional premium by the margin rate to the shadow cost of capital. In this 
case, higher margin securities will be priced in discount compared to lower margin 
securities. In other words, higher margin securities will cost more capital, and the 
price should reflect the shadow cost of capital in order to induce long position of the 
risk tolerant agent.  
It is important to note that the margins in examining the CIP deviations are not 
directly observable. In order to find a suitable proxy, one might try to observe the 
“margin threshold2” in FX swaps, however, the margin on the FX swap involving a 
long position in the Korean government bond (or implied dollar loan3) is not 
                                                           
2 FX swap counterparties in most cases establish a mutually agreed upon margin threshold. The 
threshold is determined on each swap contracts based on the credit ratings of individual parties. For 
detailed illustration on the FX swap margin threshold, refer to Barku and Ong (2010). 
3 Formally we define the return on the implied dollar loan (D) as the return from an investment by 
converting a unit of US dollar into Korean won by spot rate, receiving the interest from Korea, and 
Margin and Funding Liquidity: An Empirical Analysis on the Covered Interest Parity in Korea    33 
 
 
 
necessarily equal to the margin threshold imposed in the FX swap. For example, a 
foreign bank (FB) enters into a sell&buy FX swap with a domestic bank (DB) in 
which the FB provides $10 million in exchange for \11,000 million now, and after 
three month, the FB repays \11,000 million and receives $11 million at the swap 
rate of \1,000 per unit of US dollar. Suppose that the margin threshold for the FB is 
set at $0.5 million while \77 million for the DB. Since margins are basically the 
difference between face value and collateral value of a security, the US dollar can be 
considered as a security with 5% margin while the Korean won with 7% margin. 
However, the 5% of margin (or haircut) set for FB is not actually the margin on the 
implied dollar loan because the collateral value of the FX swap and a long position in 
the government bond cannot be determined from the margin threshold. Assuming 
that there is a security dealer who can make a reverse repo4 agreement with FB so 
that he can make a collateralized loan to FB based on the implied dollar loan, the 
repo margin5 may be considered as the margin on the implied dollar. Since the 
margin on the implied dollar loan can be considered to reflect the credit worthiness 
and/or the liquidity of the Korean government bond, the higher worthiness or 
liquidity on the Korean government bond, the lower the margin will be, and 
therefore, funding for the long position in the implied dollar loan will be more 
accessible. Unfortunately, the empirical data on the reverse repo that would permit 
identification of the margin on the implied dollar loan is generally unavailable. Still, 
it is possible to extract the margin on the implied dollar loan based on our empirical 
procedure explained in the followings. 
Especially, we extract a measure of the funding conditions (or the margin set for 
the implied dollar loan) using the time series properties of discrete approximation of 
a continuous time diffusion process for the equilibrium deviations of equivalent 
asset prices. Since the funding conditions for the implied dollar loan and US dollar 
libor loan is not directly observable, it is helpful to extract the funding conditions 
using the Kalman filter and investigate the relevance of the extracted funding 
conditions in explaining the deviations from CIP. The model that we consider to 
extract the funding conditions is a nonlinear standard state space model where the 
funding conditions can be exponentially deteriorated by some underlying latent 
factor. The state space model has attractive features that the extracted funding 
conditions based on the Kalman filter are stochastic, time-varying and predicted 
based on the information available up to the sample period. Therefore, once the 
unobservable funding conditions are extracted from data, further intriguing 
questions can be answered.  
In this regard, it is also interesting to investigate whether the funding conditions 
                                                                                                                                                    
reconverting the Korean won into US dollar by forward rate, i.e., D = s/ f(1 + r), where s spot, f forward 
rates in unit of Korean Won per unit of US dollar, and r is the interest rate for Korean won. 
4 A repurchase agreement (repo) is the sale of a security with a commitment by the seller to buy the 
same security back from the purchaser at a specified price at some future date. Therefore, the security 
buyer provides a collateralized loan to the security seller. A reverse repo is viewed from the perspective of 
the counterparty lending cash. 
5 The amount by which the market value of the security used as collateral (face value) exceeds the 
value of the loan (collateral value) is called the repo margin. 
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are driven by general market illiquidity. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) show 
that under certain circumstances, funding conditions (or margins) and market 
liquidity can be reinforcing, resulting to a margin spiral. When the shadow cost of 
capital is high or equivalently funding liquidity is low, high margin securities are 
less attractive because they cost more capital than lower margin securities. As a 
result, the market liquidity decreases. Moreover, expected future market illiquidity 
will increase the risk of financing a trade, and therefore, increasing the margins. As 
high margins increase market illiquidity, this leads to higher margins, which increase 
the shadow cost of capital further. The margin spiral emerges if market illiquidity 
increases margins. 
Using daily data on interest rates, spot and forward exchange rates on 
KRW/USD from January 2007 to April 2010, we extract the relative scarceness in 
funding (relative margin) of three month US libor loan and implied dollar loan 
(Korean CD converted into US dollar at spot and re-converted into Korean won at 
forward rate). The relative margin differences are the differences between the 
implied dollar margin () and US libor margin () in proportion to the US libor 
margin; (−)/. According to our data, both the CIP deviations6 and the 
shadow cost of capital are positive in our sample period. Since the risk tolerant agent 
with tight funding constraint requires additional premium which is given by the 
product of the shadow cost of capital and margin requirements, positive deviations 
imply that the margin on the implied dollar loan is greater than the US libor loan. 
Our estimates for the relative margin differences show that the margin on the 
implied dollar loan is overall greater than the US libor loan, as expected. Since the 
margin in general on an asset determines the investor’s own capital required to trade 
the asset, higher margin in the implied dollar loan implies that the funding condition 
for the Korean currency is generally worse than the US libor loan. In fact, it is not 
surprising that the funding condition for the Korean won is commonly weaker than 
the US libor loan; the uncertainties regarding the macroeconomic prudence of Korea 
- especially the foreign currency liquidity - may restrict the upper bound of leverages 
that international investors can take for the long position in the Korean won and 
make the margin on the implied dollar loan stay at a higher level than the US libor.  
Moreover, it is clearly seen from our empirical analysis that the increase in the 
relative margin differences magnified the increase in the deviation from the covered 
interest parity. After the Lehman bankruptcy, the shadow cost of capital is 
heightened and the higher margin security is further discounted so that the return on 
the implied dollar loan is expected to be much higher than the US libor loan, and as a 
result, the CIP deviation has been widen. Simultaneously, the relative margin 
differences have also been broaden and made the funding condition for the implied 
dollar loan to become increasingly degraded, magnifying the soaring the CIP 
deviation.  
Also, we observe that the relative margin differences can quickly explode to a 
very high level and solely affect the CIP deviation. After the early October 2008, the 
shadow cost of capital has been dropped; the extreme dollar funding liquidity crisis 
                                                           
6 The CIP deviations are defined as the spread between implied dollar rate (D) and spot dollar rate  
(S = (1 + r) with r being US interest rate) , i.e., CIP deviation.= D – S. 
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has been passed away. However, the relative margin differences increased extremely 
fast in this period and made the CIP deviation record the highest level of 1,000bp. 
The fast increase in the relative margin differences seems to have happened in the 
situation when the funding condition in the implied dollar loan continues to be 
deteriorated while the funding condition in the US libor loan is improved. In other 
words, the CIP deviation can deepen fast during the crisis period if the global dollar 
liquidity is improved while the funding condition in Korean currency is worsened.  
Meanwhile, we also find that the currency swap between central banks contribute 
in stabilizing the CIP deviation by decreasing the relative margin differences. On the 
late October 2008, the central bank currency swap line of $300 billion has been set. 
After a month, the relative margin differences took a downturn and dropped to the 
pre-Lehman level, and as a result, the CIP deviation also dropped down and started 
to stabilize. Since the margin on the implied dollar loan reflects the credit worthiness 
and/or the liquidity on the Korean government bond, lowered margin may imply 
that the government bond has regained its market confidence (or the collateral value 
has improved). In sum, it is evident from our analysis that the relative margin 
differences can magnify the increase of the CIP deviation in the liquidity crisis. It can 
quickly increase to the very high level and affect solely to the increase of the CIP 
deviations. Also, it seems that the central bank swap line help to improve the 
funding condition for the implied dollar loan, and finally decrease the CIP deviation. 
Another contribution of our paper is that we examine the relationship between 
the relative margin and market illiquidity. As Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) 
argued, the margin spiral can emerge if the market illiquidity can disturb the 
funding condition (or increase the margin on the security). Recently, Coffey et al. 
(2009) suggest using the overnight MBS-Treasury repo spread as an empirical proxy 
for relative market illiquidity of the two repo securities. Considering that the repo 
market is one of the main sources of funding for global banks which can participate 
in the FX swap trade, the relative market illiquidity of the two assets can be 
considered as a measure for the general market illiquidity. Using three month MBS-
Treasury spread, we find that the market illiquidity can actually explain the relative 
margin differences quite well and the margin spiral can emerge in the foreign 
currency swap market. 
It should be emphasized here that the paper is not intended for explaining the 
CIP deviations in Korea before the global financial crisis. The CIP has been 
dislocated since early 2000’s, persisting its deviation significantly positive, which 
implies that foreign investment in the government bond via FX swap could be 
profitable. In fact, Korea has experienced vast amount of capital inflows until the 
global financial crisis, although the sudden outflows of capital during the crisis 
period has disturbed financial stability in Korea. Rather, the objective of this paper is 
to examine the ways in which the global funding liquidity crisis affects the FX swap 
market in Korea, in a structural economic model. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical 
model investigated by Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), Section 3 accounts for our 
econometric methodology and empirical procedures to tackle some interesting 
questions regarding CIP deviations. Section 4 presents the main results and 
discussions. Then we conclude in Section 5.  
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Ⅱ. Theoretical Framework 
1. A Margin Based Asset Pricing Model 
 
A margin based asset pricing model has been considered by Garleanu and 
Pedersen (2011) in a general asset pricing context. In this chapter, we describe the 
model briefly and discuss the relationship between margin constraint and the 
deviation of the Law of One Price in general setting. The application of the theoretic 
model on the CIP deviations will be followed in the next section.  
Consider a continuous-time economy where two agents are populated with 
different risk aversion γ and γ. Agent a (averse agent) has higher risk aversion 
than agent b (brave agent), more averse to risk. Especially, agent a has the standard 
constant relative risk aversion preferences u(C) =  C
with γ>1, while agent 
b has log utility u(C) = log(C) with relative risk aversion γ=1. The braver agent b 
can be considered as more risk-tolerant investors such as banks or hedge funds, 
while the risk averse agent a can be considered as private (retail) investor or pension 
fund. This economy has several risky assets with price process given by an Ito 
diffusion. There are two riskless assets, one for collateralized loans and the other for 
uncollateralized loans, and each asset has riskless return denoted as r and r. Each 
security is presumed to have margin m ∈ [0,1]. The margin process is also an Ito 
diffusion and determines the investor’s own capital to trade the security. For 
example, if  m  is 10% and the security price is $100, then the investor needs to pay 
$10 from her capital while the remaining $90 is borrowed using the security as a 
collateral. In other words, the security with $100 value is accepted as a collateral for a 
$90 loan, and in this sense, the $10 difference can also be called the ‘haircut’, which is 
used interchangeably with the term ‘margin’. Note that since the loan is used to 
finance investment, the reciprocal of margin is the leverage that an investor can take 
when trading the security. For each underlying security i, there are N number of 
derivatives i with the same cash flows as i. Especially, the derivative i, k=1,…,  
pays the dividend δ. 
The equilibrium asset prices can be described by a utility maximization problem 
where each agent chooses her consumption level C
, g ∈ {a, b}, proportion of wealth 
in risky assets θ , proportion of wealth in riskless collateralized η  and 
uncollateralized loans η. Here we focus on the optimization problem for agent b. 
The logarithmic utility for consumption implies that the agent maximizes the myopic 
mean-variance utility 
 
max , r
 + η(r −  r) +  ∑ θ (μ − r) −

 ∑ θ
θ
 σ (σ
 ), , 
 
under the intertemporal budget constraint  
 
dW =  {Wt(r +  η(r −  r) + ∑ θ (μ − r) − C)}dt + W ∑ θ σ dB,  
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and a margin constraint 
 
∑ m θ  +  η ≤ 1.                                                     (1) 
 
Here the summation is carried out over all risky underlying securities and 
derivatives. The budget constraint describes the wealth process which is determined 
by the investment in risky assets, riskless assets, and consumption. The wealth after 
initial consumption will gain expected returns based on her portfolio choice, but the 
actual increase or decrease in the wealth will finally be determined by fundamental 
shocks weighted by her portfolio. The margin constraint in (1) describes the 
maximum capital usage which should be less or equal to the total wealth. Any 
position in risky securities will use her own capital (or wealth) and the remainder 
can be invested into uncollateralized loans, however the total capital use cannot 
exceed her wealth. Note that the agent’s capital usage on a risky security i  in 
proportion to the total wealth is mθ , which means that the capital is required for 
all trading, both long and short position. Let us explain why the capital is required in 
both positions first. For a long position (θ  > 0), the agent can borrow (1 – m)θ  but 
she needs to pay the remaining portion, mθ  with her own capital. For a short 
position (θ  < 0), the agent first borrows the security i  and earns the purchasing 
value θ , but she must post a cash collateral (1+m)θ  so that the net capital use is 
m θ . This nonlinear margin constraint is used by Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) to 
capture the deviation from the Law of One Price7. They show that the margin 
constraint can explain the problem facing any real-world investor. 
In addition, the risk averse investor a does not participate in the money markets 
for uncollateralized loans and may be allowed in the derivatives market in limited 
position. Especially, for the agent a, η  = 0 and θ
 ∈ A , where A  is some 
admissible set of portfolio for the derivative i. This assumption means that the 
uncollateralized money market may capture an inter-bank loan market, and the risk 
averse agent hesitates to participate in the derivatives market for some reasons, e.g., 
lack of expertise or information. 
Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) show that the excess return on a risky security is 
determined by its margin m  and the covariance between asset’s return and the risk 
tolerant agent’s consumption growth: 
   
μ − r = ρ,σ
σ  + hm ψ,                                          (2) 
 
where ρ, = corrdC/C, dP/P/dt, C is the consumption of risk tolerant 
agent, h  is 1 if the risk tolerant agent b is long security, -1 if she is short, and in [-1,1] 
if she has no position, and ψ is the risk tolerant agent’s shadow cost of funding. 
Note that the shadow cost of funding is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the 
margin constraint in (1). Equation (2) shows that the excess return is decomposed 
into two components; the covariance between returns and consumption growth, and 
                                                           
7 Garleanu and Pedersen (2008) show that the deviation of the Law of One Price cannot arise in the 
linear margin constraint given by ∑ mθ + η ≤ 1 
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the shadow cost of capital. The first component is a standard consumption risk 
premium which is well characterized by the covariance and the risk tolerant agent’s 
aversion to risk. The second component is the margin premium which arises only 
when the margin constraint of the risk tolerant agent is binding. In this case, the 
shadow cost of capital is nonzero and the agent requires additional premium in 
order to trade the security. The margin premium is given by the product of the 
shadow cost of capital (ψ) and margin requirement (m). For example, if the margin 
is 10% and the shadow cost of capital is 10%, then the additional premium required 
from the funding constraint is 0.1Í0.1=0.01= 1%. 
Since the shadow cost of capital is a Lagrange multiplier to the margin constraint, the 
first order condition with respect to η will give the equilibrium shadow cost of capital  
 
ψ = r − r. 
 
Consider an underlying security i and a derivative i which have the same cash 
flow δ and possibly the same return volatility, while the margin on these assets 
differ from each other, so that m  ≠  m
 . When the margin constrains are binding, 
the Law of One Price violates, and they will have different prices even if their cash 
flows are identical. Especially, from the above asset pricing equation, the basis (or the 
difference of expected returns) is given by 
 
μ
-μ  = (h
m
 − hm )ψ, 
 
where h = 1 or 1-  if the agent b is long or short, respectively. If the risk 
tolerant agent is long both assets, then the basis is given by (m
 − m) ψ, while if 
long the underlying security and short the derivative, then the basis is (m
 +  m) ψ. 
Therefore, depending on the position of the risk tolerant agent, the basis may be 
reduced or magnified.  
The consumption risk premium is vanished because the return volatility of the 
underlying security is assumed to be identical to the derivative. However, if they 
differ, then the basis is given by  
 
μ
-μ  = (h
m
 − hm )ψ+(ρ,σ
σ
 − ρ,σ
σ ) . 
 
This equation implies that when the return volatility of both assets differs, or 
equivalently, the covariances between the risk tolerant agent’s consumption and 
those securities are relatively distinct, the basis does not disappear even if the margin 
constraints are not binding.  
 
 
2. Testable Implication on the CIP Deviation 
 
Let s be the spot rate for KRW/USD at time t, f the forward rate, r  the 
interest rate in Korea, and r the interest rate in the US. The exchange rates are in 
units of Korean won per unit of US dollar. Under the CIP relation, the US dollar rate 
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S (= 1 + r) should be equal to the implied dollar rate which is the return from an 
investment by converting a unit of US dollar into Korean won by spot rate, receiving 
the interest from Korea, and re-converting the Korean currency into US dollar by 
forward rate. Especially, the implied dollar rate D is calculated by  
 
D =  


(1 +  r). 
 
If the relationship holds, then we have the CIP given by  
 
1 + r =  


(1 +  r). 
 
We define the realized basis y as the difference between implied dollar rate and 
the actual US dollar rate, i.e.,  
 
y = D− S. 
 
In fact, the basis y can be considered as a spread between the rate of return on the 
underlying US dollar loan (S) and on the derivative (D), which is the KRW/USD FX 
swap trade involving an investment into Korean won denominated loan. Especially, 
we can write  
 
      D− S =  
s
f
(1 + r) − (1 + r) − {(1 + r) − (1 + r)}, 
  
where r  is the riskless rate of return on the collateralized loan. From the 
equilibrium asset prices under binding margin constraints of the risk tolerant agent 
in (2), the basis y will have the expected return given by  
 
μ
 = (hm − hm)ψ + (ρ,σ
σ − ρ,σ
σ), 
 
where h  is equal to 1 if the risk tolerant agent is long the asset i, and -1 if she is 
short.  
Interestingly, we observe that h becomes 1 regardless of the agent’s position on 
the asset S (or the US dollar loan). This is because we choose the interest rate for the 
US dollar to equal to the uncollateralized loan rate, especially the US libor rate. More 
specifically, suppose that the rate of return on S is equal to the uncollateralized loan 
rate, so that r = r. In this case, the expected excess return on r is given by ψ; 
the shadow cost of capital. If we remind the equilibrium asset returns under the 
binding margin constraint of the risk tolerant agent, r = r = r + ψ. The reason 
why r  has positive premium over r  is because one unit of capital in the 
uncollateralized loan will have constant positive utility with ψ, while the same unit 
of capital in risky assets will have different utility value depending on the position8. 
                                                           
8 While the utility value for the position of a risky asset i will be mψ if she is long i and -mψ if she 
is short, the utility value for the position of a riskless uncollateralized loan is ψ, regardless of the position. 
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This means that the uncollateralized loan rate should be greater than the 
collateralized loan rate regardless of the agent’s position in the uncollateralized loan.  
For the position on the implied dollar D, it is possible that h is equal to 1 or -1 
depending on whether the risk tolerant agent is long or short D. However, we 
assume h = 1 in our following estimation procedure. Here is the rationale. As we 
will show in the next section (see Figure 1 for detail), it is apparent that the US dollar 
basis is positive on all the observations in our sample period and the short position 
(or h= -1) will imply a negative basis given the positive shadow cost of capital, 
which is not evident from the data. Therefore, we set h = 1 and h = 1, which 
means that the arbitrageurs are long in the derivative (or KRW/USD FX swap) D, 
while either short or long in the underlying US libor loan S. Reminding that the US 
dollar rate is set to be the riskless uncollateralized loan rate, the expected value for 
the realized basis (y) is given by 
 
μ
 = (m − m)ψ + ρ,σ
σ. 
 
Additionally, we slightly modify the original model of Garleanu and Pedersen 
(2011) who assume that the capital usage on the uncollateralized interbank loan is 
100% of the value that she decided to allocate to. This modification will allow 
positive basis when we use the US libor rate in calculating both the US dollar basis 
and the shadow cost of capital9. Especially, the modified margin constraints that we 
use to estimate the margin based asset pricing model is  
 
 m

|θ| + mη ≤ 1, 
 
where m ∈[0,1] is the proportion of the value in the uncollateralized loan which 
will be deducted or deposited after the choice η. This modification implies that the 
uncollateralized loan also admits funded trading and the risk tolerant agent does not 
require to post 100% capital in order to long or short the interbank loan. In essence, 
the weight to the uncollateralized loan m is different to the margin requirements to 
the risky assets i in the sense that shorting the uncollateralized loan by Δη will 
release the risk tolerant agent’s capital by m, however shorting the risky asset i by 
Δθ  will cost her capital by m . Nonetheless, for convenience, we call m as the 
margin on the uncollateralized loan. 
In this case, if we define the modified shadow cost of capital as 
 
ψ =  


,                                                             (3) 
 
then we can find that the expected value for the realized dollar basis (y) is given by  
 
                                                           
9 A simple application of the asset pricing equation (2) will show that under no consumption risks, the 
US dollar basis can be written as y = (m − 1)ψ, where m ∈ [0,1]. In this case, the theoretical basis 
should be always less or equal to zero. 
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μ
 = (m − m)ψ + ρ,σ
σ = 
 

 ψ + ρ,σ
σ. 
 
As we can see, the realized dollar basis (or the CIP deviation) can be explained by the 
shadow cost of capital, relative margin differences, and the consumption risk 
premium. The relative margin differences can capture the relative funding 
conditions of Korean currency compared to the US libor loan. For example, if the 
funding condition of the implied dollar loan is deteriorated, or equivalently, m 
increases, the realized dollar basis is expected to increase. Also, we can expect that 
the increase of the CIP deviations can also be affected by the increase of the shadow 
cost of capital or the increase of the volatility on the implied dollar loan. In the next 
section, we describe the econometric methodology where the relative margin 
differences are assumed to be a nonlinear logistic function of an unobservable latent 
factor. 
Ⅲ. Econometric Methodology 
1. Discrete Approximation to the Continuous-time Asset Pricing  
Equation 
 
Here we explain how to specify and estimate the model for the realized basis in 
the CIP relations. We set the margin condition as time-varying and a nonlinear 
function of unobservable (or latent) state variable. As noted before, the funding 
conditions (or the margin requirements) are not directly observable in the FX swap 
market, and moreover, they seem to be dependent on the market conditions, such as 
market illiquidity; see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) for example. The logistic 
form of nonlinearity is used to restrict the margin requirements to be in an 
admissible range and to model the nonlinear variations in the funding conditions 
depending on the state variables. In what follows, we describe our empirical 
methodology to identify the parameters, and to make an inference for testable 
implications on the realized dollar basis () and the funding liquidity condition. 
Now, we consider the return processes of the US dollar uncollateralized loan S 
and its derivative D given by Ito diffusions as  
 


−  = , 
 
and  
 


−  =  + ,
  +   , 
 
where ψ is the Lagrange multiplier of our modified model in (3). For simplicity, we 
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assume that there is no dividend10 for asset S and D. The difference of these two 
return processes is given by 
 


− 


= 
 −  

  + ,
  + , 
 
where ψ is the Lagrange multipler in the original problem. 
Over an interval t, t, the realized basis process (y)can be represented as 
follows:  
 
 ≡  


− 


 


=  ,


+  ,


+  ,

  
 
where b, =  ρ,σ
σ,  b, = (m  −  m)/m. The left hand side is the realized 
basis in the interval t, t, and the first term in the right hand side is time-varying 
consumption risk premium, the second term margin premium, and the last term is 
considered to be the disturbances in general. If the time interval ∆= t − t is 
relatively small, we can approximate the above continuous-time model into a usual 
discrete-time counterpart. Especially, we can consider a usual time-varying 
parameter model given by 
  
 =  , +  , +  , ~(0, ), 
 
where β, = ∆b , β, = ∆b , and ψ = ψ . For the brevity of notations, we 
will use the usual discrete time index t instead of j in what follows. 
 
 
2. Nonlinear State Space Model in a Logistic Form 
 
It is clear that the parameter β, should be in an admissible range because the 
margin requirement m  should be in the interval [0, 1]. Especially, the parameter 
β, is a bounded function of relative difference in the funding conditions, which is 
not observable and possibly depends on the economic states nonlinearly11. A 
nonlinear transformation of the underlying latent state variable based on a logistic 
function can deal with the boundedness and nonlinearity. Moreover, the parameter 
β, represents the consumption risk of the risk tolerant agent whose consumption 
process (C) is also not observable in general. Therefore, a nonlinear state-space 
model approach for the realized basis process is relevant for the estimation of the 
parameters. 
Specifically, we consider a nonlinear state space model in a logistic form of 
nonlinearity: 
                                                           
10 This assumption is equivalent to the setting where the dividend process for i and i are identical. 
11 Since the margin requirements are positive and cannot exceed 1, the relative margin (m  −
 m)/m should be in the range of [−1, +∞). 
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 = , + , +  ,     ~ (0, ), 
, = , + , ,  = 0,1, 
 , = , , 
,   ~ N(0, , ), 
 
where β(∙) is the relative margin function which is determined by a latent state 
variable in the following fashion  
 
() =  −1 + 

1 +   (−), 
 
with ν> 0. In this model, β, can be interpreted as time-varying consumption risk 
premium and β(∙)  is the relative difference in margin condition which is a 
nonlinear function of the state variable (w,). The logistic function can capture the 
nonlinearity of the relative margin difference with respect to the latent state variable 
w,, and at the same time, β(∙) is restricted to be in the interval [−1, −1 + v]12. 
Depending on the value of v, the relative margin difference will have the upper 
bound −1 + v. 
In order to deal with the nonlinearity, we follow the approach by Kim and 
Nelson (2006). Especially, the nonlinearity of β(∙) is tackled down by local 
linearization based on the Taylor expansion around the predicted value of w, 
based on previous information. The above state space model can be reformulated as  
 
y∗ = ∗∗ +  ∗,    ∗ = ∗ + ∗, 
 
where  
 
y∗ =  y − −1 +

1 + e,|  –
e,| 
(1 + e,| ) ,|   , 
∗ = [1, 
,| 
(,| ) ], 
∗ = , ,  ,
, 
∗ =  ,  ∗ = ,  , ,  
.  
 
For the estimation of the parameters, we simply apply the standard Kalman filter 
approach. Using the Kalman filter, we can extract the time-varying consumption risk 
premium β,, and the relative difference in the funding condition β(w,).  
 
 
                                                           
12 The lower bound for β(∙) is determined by the lower bound of the relative margin difference 
(m  − m)/m multiplied by the time interval ∆. Typically, the time interval for daily observations is set 
to be 1/250, but we set ∆= 1 because we use annualized dollar basis in our empirical analysis. 
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IV. Empirical Analysis 
1. Data  
 
In order to measure the realized US dollar basis, we use three month libor rate for 
the US interest rate and the yield for three month CD for the Korean interest rate. 
The three month rates are in annum so we first adjust the rates for three-month 
period by multiplying 91/360 to the rates, and convert the resulting dollar rates into 
annum. The US libor rate is obtained from Bloomberg, and the CD rates are from the 
Korea Financial Investment Association. In order to calculate the forward rate, we 
use a series of swap point data, which is often used to quote the FX swap trade. 
Especially, our forward rate is obtained by the summation of the spot rate and swap 
point. All data for the spot rate and swap point are observed at 16:00 in New York 
time and the source is Bloomberg.  
We exploit the shadow cost of capital to extract the relative difference in the 
margin condition using the nonlinear state space model. The empirical measure for 
the shadow cost of capital is based on the interest rate spread between 
uncollateralized and collateralized loan, which is determined by the margin based 
asset pricing model of Garleanu and Pedersen (2011). As discussed earlier, we use 
three month US libor rate as a proxy for the uncollateralized loan rate and three 
month Treasury bill rate for the collateralized loan rate13. This spread is often called 
the TED spread, which measures the shadow cost of capital in bad times when the 
margin constraints are binding. 
 
 
2. CIP Deviation and Relative Margin 
 
In this section, we present the empirical findings regarding the CIP deviations 
and estimation results for the margin based asset pricing model based on our 
nonlinear state space model. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of Korean, US interest rates, spot and 
forward exchange rates of KRW/USD from Jan 1, 2007 to Apr 16, 2010. As we can 
see, all the variables show high persistence for the whole period with autocorrelation 
coefficients exceeding 0.9. This is a well expected feature of the interest rates and 
exchange rate data. Interestingly, if we compare the samples from pre and post 
Lehman bankruptcy, we can see that the persistency has been increased for all the 
variables. Similarly, the realized US dollar basis (or the deviation from the CIP) has 
been increased during the recent financial crisis, especially after the Lehman 
bankruptcy. The mean level has jumped from 1.52% to 2.96%, and so does the 
standard deviation of the basis. The proxy for the shadow cost of capital (or the TED  
                                                           
13 Coffey et al. (2009) also use the three month Treasury bill rate as a proxy of the collateralized loan 
rate. 
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[Figure 1] US Dollar Basis and TED Spread 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure presents US dollar basis and the TED spread from Jan 3, 2007 to April 
16, 2010. The realized US dollar basis yt is calculated by yt = st/ft1 + rt
D-(1 +rts), 
where  rtD is the three month Korean CD rates, rts is three month US libor rates, st 
is the spot exchange rate, and ft is the forward rates. The TED spread is the 
spread between three month US libor and three month Treasury bill rates. 
 
 
<Table 1> Summary Statistics  
 
Pre Lehman Period Post Lehman Period Whole Period 
Jan 1, 2007 – Sep 15, 2008 Sep 16, 2008 – Apr 16, 2010 Jan 3, 2007 – Apr 16, 2010 
Mean Std. 
Auto. 
Coef. Mean Std. 
Auto. 
Coef. Mean Std. 
Auto. 
Coef. 
 5.29 028 0.97 3.18 1.17 098 4.25 1.35 0.98 
 4.34 1.20 0.98 1.00 1.05 0.99 2.69 2.02 0.97 
 960.68 49.03 0.95 1260.83 112.42 0.95 1108.45 173.15 0.97 
 959.43 51.26 0.95 1258.06 108.38 0.95 1106.46 171.54 0.97 
 401.46 1.30 0.93 399.57 3.06 0.96 400.53 2.52 0.96 
 399.94 1.20 0.98 396.61 1.05 0.99 398.3. 2.02 0.97 
 1.52 1.05 0.91 2.96 2.19 0.94 2.23 1.86 0.94 
 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.83 0.94 0.98 0.90 0.76 0.98 
Note: Summary statistics for Korean three month CD rates (), US three month libor rate (), spot 
KRW/USD exchange rates (), forward exchange rates (), implied dollar rates ( =/(1 +
)), dollar rates ( = 1 +  ), the dollar basis  = ( − ), and the shadow cost of capital ( ). 
The shadow cost of capital is three month TED spread. All the interest rates are in percentage units, 
and the exchange rates are in units of Korean won per unit of US dollar. 
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<Table 2> Estimation Result of the Nonlinear State Space Model  
Parameters Estimate Standard Errors 
 0.053 (0.009) 
, 0.108 (0.006) 
, 0.190 (0.016) 
 8.655 (1.307) 
Log likelihood  -27.831 
Note: The table presents the estimation results of the nonlinear state space model in Section 3. 1.  
 
 
spread) seems to be decreasing in its mean level from 0.96 to 0.83 after the Lehman 
bankruptcy. Figure 1 presents the realized US dollar basis and the TED spread for 
our sample period. It is quite apparent that the TED spread and basis move very 
closely for the period from January 2007 to November 2008, however after the 
Lehman bankruptcy the co-movement looks to be very weak and dying out. This 
might imply that the contribution from the funding liquidity premium is getting 
smaller after the bankruptcy, meanwhile other factors, such as the consumption risk 
or default risk contributed more in explaining the dollar basis. 
Table 2 presents the estimation result for our nonlinear state space model in a 
logistic form. All the parameters are estimated to be significant. The volatility of the 
disturbances is estimated to be 0.053 while the volatilities for the latent factors are 
estimated to be 0.108 and 0.190, respectively. The volatility of the margin premium is 
considered to be much larger compared to the volatility for the consumption risk 
premium because the relative margin differences are set to be a nonlinear function of 
more volatile latent factor (w,). The upper bound v is estimated to be 8.655, 
implying that the margin on the implied loan can be about 10 times higher than the 
margin on the US libor loan in an extreme case. This means that the investor’s own 
capital can cost up-to 10 times more when taking positions in the implied dollar loan 
compared to the US libor loan. 
Figure 2 shows the extracted relative difference in margins based on our 
nonlinear state space model. The relative margin difference can be interpreted as the 
relative difference in funding liquidity (or tightness in funding liquidity) in 
KRW/USD FX swap market compared to the US libor market. Since the margins are 
the reciprocal of the leverage that an investor can take in funding the position of a 
risky asset, higher margins imply lower leverages and vice versa. This implies that 
higher margin securities are, in general, harder to fund than lower margin securities.  
As we can see, the relative differences in margins are positive for most of our 
sample period. This implies that the funding condition of the FX swap market in 
Korea is, in general, poorer than the US libor market. Considering the uncertainties 
regarding the macroeconomic prudence of Korea, especially the foreign currency 
liquidity problem during the global financial crisis, the upper bound of leverages 
that international investors can take for the long position in the Korean won could be 
restricted and make the margin on the implied dollar loan stay at a higher level than 
the US libor. Moreover, we find evidence that the increase in the relative margin  
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[Figure 2] Relative Margin Differences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure presents the relative difference in margin conditions (-)/  based on our nonlinear 
state space model and its 95% confidence bands (based on delta-method). The extracted relative 
margin differences are from May 31, 2007 to April 16, 2010.  
 
 
differences has magnified the increase in the deviation from the covered interest 
parity. The CIP deviation, as we discussed earlier, is determined by the relative 
margin differences, the shadow cost of capital, and the consumption risk premium. If 
we look at the period from the Lehman bankruptcy to the early October 2008, both 
the relative margin differences and the shadow cost of capital spiked up, resulting in 
the soar of the CIP deviations. We also can check from Figure 2 that the relative 
margin differences are more significant during the period when the CIP deviations 
soared. This implies that the increase of the CIP deviations are largely driven by the 
increase of the shadow cost of capital, and the relative margin differences have a 
magnifying effect of further increasing the deviation. Also, we observe that the 
relative margin differences can quickly explode to a very high level and solely affect 
the CIP deviation. If we focus on the period from the early October 2008 to the early 
December 2008, the relative margin differences boosted up to the highest level of 3.9 
while the shadow cost of capital decreased significantly to the pre-Lehman level. In 
this period, the CIP deviations recorded the highest level of 1,000bp. The reason why 
the CIP deviations increased further even if the shadow cost of capital is decreased is 
because the relative margin differences have shot up very quickly. It seems that the 
funding condition in the implied dollar loan has deteriorated while the funding 
condition in the US libor loan has improved, so that the relative margin differences 
have quickly increased and contributed to the skyrocketing CIP deviations. The 
improved funding liquidity in the US libor loan and the decrease of the shadow cost 
of capital might be affected by the large swap line between central banks, especially 
between Federal Reserve and European Central Banks in the mid-September 2008. 
Meanwhile, the funding condition in the implied dollar loan is disturbed by the 
concern on the foreign currency liquidity crisis of the financial institutions in Korea. 
As the gap between the implied dollar and US libor funding conditions widened, the  
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[Figure 3] Margin Premium vs. Risk Premium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure presents the margin premium and consumption risk premium imposed in the 
US dollar basis. Both the margin and risk premium are extracted by the nonlinear state 
space model. Especially, the figure plots , and ,  for the margin and risk 
premium, respectively. 
 
 
CIP deviations have further increased and recorded the highest level. In the mean 
time, the $30 billion swap line between Federal Reserve and the Bank of Korea (BOK) 
has been set at the end of October 2008. A month later, the relative margin 
differences dropped, and as a result, the CIP deviations also came down to the pre-
Lehman level.  
The swap lines between Federal Reserve and the central banks of developing 
countries have positively affected the decrease of both the shadow cost of capital and 
the margin on the US libor loan, while the swap line between Federal Reserve and 
BOK seems to attenuate the margin on the implied dollar loan. Since the margin on 
the implied dollar loan reflects the credit worthiness and/or the liquidity on the 
Korean government bond, lowered margin implies that the government bond has 
regained its market confidence (or the collateral value has improved). As Baba and 
Shim (2010) noted, the swap line effectively increase the BOK’s foreign reserves, 
which should have enhanced market confidence, leading to the decrease of margin 
on the implied dollar loan. However, it seems that the time-lag between the swap 
lines may affect the funding conditions differently, amplify the relative margin, and 
increase the CIP deviations further. Note that after December 2008, the relative 
margin differences are no longer significant in explaining the variations of the CIP 
deviations. This implies that the shadow cost of capital disappears in the pricing of 
the price deviations and the funding liquidity crisis might pass away. 
We also find that the consumption risk premium also explains the CIP deviations. 
Figure 3 presents the margin premium and consumption risk premium imposed in 
the CIP deviations. The margin premium is calculated by multiplying the relative 
margin differences to the shadow cost of capital. As we can see, the consumption risk 
premium is relatively stable compared to the margin premium. Assuming that the 
consumption volatility itself is relatively small, the consumption risk premium is 
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basically determined by the volatility of the implied dollar loan (or the swap point). 
As expected, the consumption risk premium increased after the Lehman bankruptcy 
and stayed around 2% level until the mid 2009. Since the margin premium is not 
significant after December 2008, it seems that the decrease in the CIP deviations after 
December 2008 is largely affected by the stabilization of the volatility in the FX swap 
market. In this regard, it is clear that when the FX swap market is stable and the 
liquidity concern is no longer binding, the CIP deviations will be much decreased. 
In sum, we find that the shadow cost of capital together with relative margin 
differences can explain the deviation from CIP in the sample period before December 
2008. From our analysis, it was evident that the relative margin differences can 
magnify the increase of the CIP deviation in the liquidity crisis period. Moreover, the 
relative margin differences can quickly increase to the very high level and affect 
solely to the increase of the CIP deviations when the funding liquidity in the global 
money market improved with some time-lag. Also, it seems that the central bank 
swap line between Federal Reserve and the Bank of Korea help to improve the 
funding condition for the implied dollar loan, and finally decrease the CIP deviation. 
After the liquidity crisis period, the stabilization of the FX market seems to be 
important in decreasing the CIP deviations.  
 
 
3. Does Market Illiquidity Affect Margin? 
 
Now we turn our attention to the question whether market illiquidity affects the 
relative margin differences. As Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) argued, the 
margin spiral can emerge if the market illiquidity can disturb the funding condition 
(or increase the margin on the security). In this case, the margin spiral can emerge so 
that the margins have magnifying effect in increasing the financial instability. In 
order to investigate the relationship between the margins and the market illiquidity, 
we consider overnight MBS-Treasury repo spread as an empirical proxy for the 
market illiquidity. Recently, Coffey et al. (2009) suggest using the overnight MBS-
Treasury repo spread as an empirical proxy for relative market illiquidity of the two 
repo securities. As discussed in their paper, repo markets have become one of the 
main sources of funding for commercial banks, investment banks and securities 
lenders in recent years. Therefore, the relative illiquidity of MBS repo to the Treasury 
repo is assumed to be general collateralized loan market illiquidity in the sense that 
the illiquidity in the repo market will affect the trading activities of the banks, 
leading to the money market illiquidity. Also, the relative margin differences may be 
affected by the credit risks of the Korean government bond because the margin on 
the implied dollar loan should reflect the credit worthiness of the government bond. 
When the credit risk is high, then overall expected risk compensation is increasing so 
that the asset prices including the collateral value will fall. This can affect the margin 
on the implied loan. 
We use three month MBS-Treasury spread, which are the spread between three 
month repo rate using MBS as collateral and three month repo rate using Treasury 
bill as collateral. We also use the CDS spread of the 5 year dollar denominated 
government bond of Korea for the credit risk. All the data is provided by Bloomberg. 
50    韓國開發硏究 / 2012. Ⅰ  
 
 
<Table 3> Market Liquidity and Relative Margins  
Variables Estimate t-value 
MBS-Repo Spread 0.572 (5.37) 
CDS Premium 0.382 (12.67) 
Constant -0.024 (-0.46) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.517  
Note: The table represents a simple regression results of  =  + , where  is the relative margin 
differences and  is a collection of explanatory variables, especially the market illiquidity (MBS-
Repo spread), counterparty risk (CDS premium) and a constant term. The sample period is from 
May 31, 2007 to Dec 31, 2008, and the number of samples in this period is 683. 
 
 
[Figure 4] Fitted Relative Margin Differences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure presents relative margin (-)/  and market illiquidity. We use 
three month MBS-Treasury repo spread as a proxy for the market illiquidity and 
CDS spread for 5-year government bond of Korea for the credit risks. For the 
estimation of relative margin, we use the nonlinear state space model. Note that 
the starting date is May 31, 2007 because we discard the first 100 estimates. 
 
 
Table 3 presents a simple regression result of the relative margin differences 
being regressed on our proxies for the market illiquidity and credit risks for the 
sample period from May 31, 2007 to December 31, 2008 when the funding liquidity 
concerns seem to affect the CIP deviations. Note that the extracted relative margins 
are available from May 31, 2007 because we discard the first 100 observations for 
estimating the nonlinear state space model. As we can see from the table, all the 
regression coefficients are significant and positive. This suggests that both the market 
illiquidity and credit risks increase the relative margin differences. We also can check 
from Figure 4 that the overall variations of the relative margin differences are well 
captured by the market illiquidity and the credit risks.    
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V. Conclusion 
There has been lasting question on why the deviation of covered interest rate 
parity in KRW/USD FX market has lasted long and wide, especially during the 
global financial crisis. In order to answer the question, we use the framework of 
Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) who relates the funding constraint and deviations of 
the Law of One Price. According to their result, the margin constraint has an 
important role in equilibrium asset prices and the Law of One Price will be violated 
under the binding margin constraint of the risk tolerant agent. When the 
fundamental is bad, the margin requirements are binding so that the arbitrageurs 
cannot borrow from the risk averse agents as they wanted and this will decrease the 
collateralized loan rate (or riskless interest rates, or Treasury rates) in order to induce 
the risk averse agents not to lend as much they would like to. Also, the 
uncollateralized loan rate (or interbank loan rates) will be greater than the 
collateralized loan rate to reflect the shadow cost of capital of the risk tolerant agent. 
The shadow cost of capital, which is close to zero in normal times, will spike up in 
the financial turmoil and affect the asset prices with identical cash flows but different 
margins. In the context of CIP deviations, the different margin requirements (or 
haircuts) of US libor loan and implied dollar loan induced from FX swap trade will 
contribute to the increase in the CIP deviations.  
Our estimation results show that the margin difference together with the shadow 
cost of capital is the main cause of the CIP deviations. With our empirical analysis for 
the CIP deviations, we extract the relative margin differences and find that the 
shadow cost of capital together with relative margin differences can explain the 
deviation from CIP in the sample period before December 2008. From our analysis, it 
was evident that the relative margin differences can magnify the increase of the CIP 
deviation in the liquidity crisis period. Moreover, the relative margin differences can 
quickly increase to the very high level and solely affect to the increase of the CIP 
deviations when the funding liquidity in the global money market improved with 
some time-lag. Also, it seems that the central bank swap line between Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of Korea help to improve the funding condition for the 
implied dollar loan, and finally decrease the CIP deviation. After the liquidity crisis 
period, the stabilization of the FX market seems to be important in decreasing the 
CIP deviations.  
Another contribution of our paper is that we provide an empirical evidence for 
the relationship between the relative margins and market illiquidity. In a recent 
work by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) on the margin and funding constraints, 
lower market liquidity may increase margins, which tightens investor’s funding 
condition further, leading to the so-called margin spiral. Such a feedback effect has 
been considered based on the assumption that the market illiquidity is increasing the 
margin requirements, and we show an evidence that the market illiquidity can 
increase the margins. We also believe that the margin and funding liquidity channel 
which derives the CIP deviations can be compared to other interesting theoretical 
models with alternative model specification. We leave these tasks to future works.  
52    韓國開發硏究 / 2012. Ⅰ  
 
 
 
 
Reference 
Aliber, R. Z., “The Interest Rate Parity Theorem: A Reinterpretation,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 81, 1973, pp.1451~1459. 
Alper, C. E., O. Ardic, and S. Fendoglu, ”The Economics of Uncovered Interest Parity 
Condition for Emerging Markets : A survey,” MPRA paper, No. 4079, 2007. 
Baba, N. and F. Packer, “Interpreting Deviations from Covered Interest Parity during the 
Financial Market Turmoil of 2007-08,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 33, 2009, pp.1953~ 
1962. 
Baba, N., F. Packer, and T. Nagano, “The Spillover of Money Market Turbulence to FX Swap 
and Cross-currency Swap Markets,” BIS Quarterly Review, 2008. 
Baba, N. and I. Shim, “Policy Responses to Dislocations in the FX Swap Market: the Experience 
of Korea,” BIS Quarterly Review, 2010, pp.29~39. 
Barkbu, B. B. and L. L. Ong, “FX Swaps: Implications for Financial and Economic Stability,” 
IMF Working Paper, 2010. 
Bhar, R., S. Kim, and T. M. Pham, “Exchange Rate Volatility and Its Impact on the Transaction 
Costs of Covered Interest Rate Parity,” Japan and the World Economy, Vol. 16, 2004. 
Brunnermeier, M. and L. H. Pedersen, “Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity,” Review of 
Financial Studies, forthcoming, 2008. 
Coffey, N., W. Hrung, H. L. Ngueyn, and A. Sarkar, “Capital Constraints, Counterparty Risk, 
and Deviations from Covered Interest Parity,” Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, 2009. 
Frenkel, J. and R. Levich, “Transaction Costs and Interest Arbitrage: Tranquil Versus 
Turbulent Periods,” Journal of Political Economy, 85, 1977, pp.1209~1226. 
Garleanu, N. and L. H. Pedersen, “Margin-based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law 
of One Price,” The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24, 2011, pp.1980~2022. 
Harvey, A., E. Ruiz, and E. Sentana, “Unobserved Component Time Series Models with Arch 
Disturbances,” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 52, 1992, pp.129~157. 
Ito, T., “Capital Controls and Covered Interest Parity Between the Yen and the Dollar,” 
Economic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1986, pp.223~241. 
Kim, C. J. and C. R. Nelson, “Estimation of a Forward-looking Monetary Policy Rule: A Time-
varying Parameter Model Using ex Post Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 53, 
No. 8, 2006, pp.1949~1966. 
Ryu, S. C. and S. J. Park, “Analysis on Efficiency and Stability of Korean FX· Currency Swap 
Market,” Monthly Bulletin, The Bank of Korea, October, 2008, pp.54~92 (In Korean). 
Yang, Y. H. and H. R. Lee, “Analysis on Arbitrage Opportunity, Foreign Bank Branches, and 
Foreign Investment on Domestic Bond,” Monthly Bulletin, The Bank of Korea, August, 
2008, pp.55~89 (In Korean). 
Yoo, B. K., “Global Financial Crisis and Arbitrage Opportunity – the Case of Korea,” Working 
Paper, No. 426, The Bank of Korea, 2010 (In Korean). 
Whang, W. M., “Efficiency of Forward Exchange Market and Covered Interest Parity 
Deviation,” Working Paper, No. 419, The Bank of Korea, 2010 (In Korean). 
 
